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In the Suprem.e Court of the 
State of Utah 
OREM CITY, a ·Municipal Corporation, 
Plaintiff -Appellant, 
-vs. 
DEE PYNE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
CASE 
NO. 10211 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATE1~ENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant-Respondent was charged with the· crime of 
a misdemeanor in the Orem City Court for failing to pay 
a license tax to Orem City for a retail sales used automo-
bile business operated by hi·m in Orem. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
In theOrem City Court the Defendant-Respondent was 
convicted and thereafter appealed his conviction to the 
Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah in and ~or Utah 
County claiming that the license ordinance was void · as 
to him. 
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The Defendant-Respondent being entitled to a trial 
de norvo entered a plea of "not guilty", but stipulated that 
during the time charged in the complaint he conducted a 
retail sales used car business within Orem City and made 
srues subjoot to the sales tax imposed by the State of Utah 
and had not paid any Orem City license, tax. 
Orem City Ordinance No. 26, passed by the City Coun-
cil of Orem City May 22, 1961, and duly published in the 
Orem..1Geneva Times on June 1, 1961, a newspaper of gen-
eral cir.culation in Orem City, was introduced in evidence 
by stipulation· of the parties. The Def-endant-Respondent 
moved the· Court for dismissal of the complaint _solely on 
the ground that the ordinance is invalid .in. imposing any 
tax on his used car sales business on the basis that the or-
dinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory in 
its application to the Defendant-Respondent's business. 
The Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah in and for 
Utah County on date of August 3, 1964, on the grounds 
that the ordinance is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discrim-
inatory ,granted the motion and entered an Order of Dis-
missal in accordance therewith. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff-Appellant in this appeal requests. the 
Court for an order reversing the lower court Order of Dis-
missal and de·clare Orem City Ordinance No. 26 valid and 
constitutional as against the Defendant-Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Th~ is no reco~d of evidence other than stipulation 
by the parties that the Defendant-Respondent during the 
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time charged in the complaint conducted a retail sales used 
automobile business within Orem City and made sales sub-
ject to the sales tax imposed- by the State of Utah and had 
not paid any Orem City license tax. 
0'rem City O·rdinance No. 26 was introduced in evi-
dence by stipulation of parties; that section 3 of said ordi-
nance imposed a license fee on the Defendant-Respondent 
of one-tenth of 1% of the gross sales of Defendant-Respond-
ent's business. The Defendant-Respondent- moved for dis-
missal of the complaint on the grounds that the ordinance 
is unreasonable, arbitrary, and discriminatory in its appli-
cation to the Defendant-Respondent's business. 
APPELLANT'S POINT 
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE OR-
DINANCE WAS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY, AND 
DISCRIMINATO'RY IN ITS APPLICATIO·N TO DE· 
FE·~lDANT-RESPONDENT'S BUSINESS AS GROUNDS 
FOR GRANTING THE O·RDER O,F DISMISSAL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE COURT E.RRE·D IN H·OLDING THAT THE OR-
DINANCE WAS UNREASO·NABLE, ARBITRARY, AND 
DISCRIMINATORY IN ITS APPLICATION TO DE .. 
FENlDIAN'I'-RE'SPO·ND·ENT'S BUSINE'SS AS GROUNDS 
FOR GRANTING THE o~RDER OF DISMISSAL. 
Orem City Ordinance No. 26 is the ordinanee in ques-
tion held to be unreasonable, ·arbitrary, and discriminatocy. 
The ordinance was enacted by the authority given to cities 
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by Sectlon 10-8-~0, Utah Oode Annotated 1953, and Sec-
tion 10:-8-80, ,Utah Oode Annotated 1953, to tax businesses 
for revenue purposes, provided, however, as it is set forth 
in Section 10-8-80, Utah Code Annotated 19'53, that "all 
such license fees and taxes shall be ~orm in respect to 
the class upon which they are imposed.'' Orem City Or-
dinance No. 26 specifically states that the purpose of . the 
ordinance is to raise revenue. 
Section 3 of Orem City Oroinance No. 26 levies a tax 
of 1/10 of l% of the gross sales of -businesses in Orem City 
engag~d in sell~g tangible personal ,property· where such 
sales are subject-.to Utah State sales tax, with a minimum 
of $6.25 per quarter-year and a maximum of $75.00. for 
the same period. The Defendant-Respondent being en-
gag~ ,in the. sale of tangible personal--property consisting 
~- uSe,d- automobiles comes under Section 3 of Orem City 
. . . . . . ~ . . ~· . 
Or~ance No. 26. The -question then of whether or not 
~~-:-o.~ce is unreasona:ble, arbitrary, and discrimina-
_Jn~ iS rto·-·be determined by the law as to unif~ity _in 
respect to a class upon which a tax ·is imposed. 
The general rule of law as stated by our own Supreme 
Court ·in the case of Slater vs. Salt Lake City, et al, 115 
Urtah 476, 206 P 2d 153, is as follows: 
"Discrimination is the essence of .classification 
and does violence to the eonstitUtion only when the 
basis upon which it is founded is unreasonable. In 
fixing ·fue Umits of the class, the legislative body has 
a wide -discretion and this court may not concern it-
self with the wisdom or policy orf the law. Our func-
tion is to determine whether an enactment operates 
· equally upon all persons similarly situated. If it does 
then ·the discrimination is within permissible legis-
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lative li:rnits. If it does not, then the differentiation 
would be without reasonable basis and the act does not 
meert the test of constitutionality." 
The test laid down iby this case is rthat the ordinanc'e 
must opemte equally upon all persons similarly situated. 
Here, the Defendant-Respondent is in the retail used auto-
mobile sales business. No question is raised as to whether 
or not other retail used automobile sales businesses are 
taxed on a different basis. The ordinance treats used oar 
dealers all alike. This principle is illustrated by the case 
orf Bradley vs. Richmond, 227 US 477, 57 L ed. 603, 33 
SC p 318. The United States Court had before it an ap-
peal in which the Plaintiff in error was convicted in a low-
er court for violation of an ordinance fo~bidding the carry-
ing on of a business of a private banker without a license. 
The case before the court upon the claim made in the State 
Court stated the ordinance denied both the equal prortection 
and due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The ordinance in question required all persons de-
siring to pursue certain businesses and occupations to pay 
a special license tax for the privilege of prosecuting such 
business. Many pursuits were named, among them real 
es·tate agents, commission merchants, brokers, auctioneers, 
private bankers, etc. The persons required to pay such 
special license tax were divided by the Finance Commit-
tee of the City Couneil into thirteen ~classes 
The Plaintiff in error, who was in the banking busi-
ness, claimed that the actual operation of the ordinance 
brought abourt: an unjust and illegal discrimination in that 
he ha~l been classified in such a manner as to subject him 
and his business to a higher tax as a condition orf issuing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
to him a lirense, than that required by that of many other 
private bankers. The court said that some private bankers 
were put into classes trhat subjected them to less taxation 
than the class into which the Plaintiff in error was placed 
is the only allegation which would tend to show discrim-
ination, but there was evidence tending to show that rthe 
business done by the Plainrtiff in error and ten other ·per-
sons or firn1s was that of lending money at higher rates 
upon salaries and household furniture, while the kind of 
business done by others in the same general business was 
the lending of money upon commercial securities. Obvi-
ously, the burden was upon the Plaintiff in error to show 
an illegal and capricious classification. The State Court 
said fuart he 1had failed to show that these private bankers 
favo,red in tJhe classification were doing the same business. 
'Dhe court_ affirmed the judgment of the lower court. 
In Sedalia ex rei. Bauman w. Standard Oil Company, 
66 Fed. 2d 757, 95 ALR 1514, a U. S. Court decision, the 
court. said: . 
"The appellee claims the ordinance is unreason-
able because it descriminates between those who may 
sell ·gasoline and haul it in containers such as are de• 
scribed in the ordinance and otheTS who haul it in 
containers of less ~size, and discriminates between those 
who may both sell and transport gasoline as described 
in the ordinance within the city and others who may 
sell it within the city, but transport it into, out of, or 
through :the city ·and between those whose whole busi-
ness is the sale and transportation of gasoline and oth-
ers who sell other articles than gasoline." 
The court noted that it did not appear that there were 
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any other vendors of gasoline who transported it in any 
manne,r. 
The court. then said that the presumption of the va-
lidity o[ an ordinance, as in the case of other laws, may 
not be overthrown by the suggestion of discriminations 
that may never be proved. 
The trial court had said that the ordinance was invalid 
for lack of uniformity in the operation because irt omitted 
to impose a similar tax upon those who sold gasoline but 
did not transport it, and upon those who transported .it in 
containers of less ·capacity than five gallons. 
The U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals opinion in answer 
to this said: 
"Assuming that there may have been other3 who 
sold or transported this commodity under these cir-
cumstances, the requirement of unifonnity . is met if 
_·the tax falls alike on _all ·PersonS who are in substan-
tially the same situation." 
The court then cited the case of City of St. Charles 
vs. Schulte, 305 Mo. 124, 264 SW 654, and quoted from the 
case as follows: 
"The Legislature delegated rto cities orf the thiro 
class, as it was competent for it to do, · authority to 
levy and collect a license tax on the vendors o[ soft 
drinks. Under this general power so delegarted to it 
the City of St. Charles was not bound to levy the same 
amount upon all vendors of soft drinks. It eoruld, in 
its discretion, divide them upon any reasonable basis 
into classes, as, for example, the volume of business 
done (City of Aurora v. MeGannon [138 Mo. 38, 39 
SW 469,] supra), or the specific eharacter of the drinks 
sold (In re Watson [17 S.D. 486, 97 NW 463, 2 Ann. 
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Oas. 321,] $l}pra,) and.fix a differ~t tax for each class 
(1. Cooley, Tax'n 4th Ed. 353). ·upon the same prin-
ciple peddlers have long been classified in this state 
·for the purpose of taxation. ·- Section ·· 9259, · R.S. 1919 
Mo. St~ Ann. 13318. 
There can be no doubtbut that, under well-settled 
principles, respondent was not ·bound to levy· ahd ·coi-
·lect a license tax-. upon vendors of- all kinds of· soft 
drinks~ if it imposed a tax . upon -the vendors of .any. 
It could in its discretion have imposed a tax upon those 
--who engaged in selling near beers, without . imposing 
-· a:ny· at· :a.n upon the vendors of other soft drhlks~ Car-
roll v. Wrighrt, 131 Ga. 728, -63< S.E·. ·260; Coca-Oola 
--.OJ. v. Skillman, 91 Miss. 677; 44 :So. 985." 
The court in the Sedalia ex rei. Bauman vs. Standard 
_Oil Com~any, 66 Fed._2d,:757,-95 ALR-1514, then went 
on to say: 
·"On this -recoro it iS not made to-appear that there 
- WaS ·not a reasonable basis for the- classification adop-
ted. The suggestion that the classification offends also 
.. a~~t the FQ!urteenth -Amendment to the Constitu-
-tiO!fl m the United States is .sufficiently met by what 
was . said on -that subject in Campbell Baking Co. v. 
City of Harrisonville, Mo. ( C.C.A.) 50 F. 2nd. -670." 
The- --·case ·recognizes that _-even on fu.e same type_ ,of 
business, namely soft. drinks, it may -be broken down into 
additional-classes and not violate the law as to equality:of 
treament. ·The· cases of Hays vs. Commonwealth, 55 SW 
425; State ·vs. Webber, 113 SW 1054; People vs. Smith, 
110 NW 1102; In re Abel, 7·7 Pac. 621; State vs. Montgom-
ery, 43. Atlantic 13, all sustain this view. 
'Dhe· -Orem City ordinance doesn't go this far.· To com-
pare we would say retail sales (lst class), soft: drinks (1st 
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sUibelass),,,volume'of drinks sold (2nd subclass). TheOrem 
ordinance~. stops at the- first class. 
In .. the_. case of.· Fredericksburg vs.· Sanitary Grocery 
Co., .168 Va. 57, 190 SE 318, 110 AlLR 1195~ there was a 
subclasSification :of grocecy stores, the effect of which was 
to .:put chain .stores in a separate· class. The· defendant 
raised: the .questions . of unreasonable classification· so as to 
amotmt to. discrimination, and unequal protection of the 
law. The .cOW't· retused··;the cont-entions of the ,Defend-
ant and quoted from the case of McKenney vs. :City Coun-
cil of Alexandria., .147-:Va. 157, 136 _SE 588 as follows: . 
'"The general· rute· so far as classifi!cation of busi'-
ness ·for the purpose of· taxation is concerned is· that 
trades,. O~GlJ.pations, professions _ and . privileges may 
- _he ,clas8ified for puvposes of license or. occupation :~~-- _: 
·a.nd differenrt licenses may be imposed upo!Il the vB;rl- -
ous classes -providing·_ the clasS,ificatioo is reasonable, 
-(37- C.J.- P 198, par. 52.), and .cases ·cited in headnote 
24 including a number of Virginia cases, General clas-
ses may be divided· into _particular classes and;lirenSed 
.. or tax€d." 
·The court in -the case ·of· Fredericksburg vs. Sanitary 
Grocery ·co~ 168 Va. 57, 190 SE 318, 110 ALR 1195, after -
stating the general rule above, stated: 
"It is not , the function of this court in cases like 
, the present to consider the propriety or unjustness, of 
the ,tax to seek for the motives or to criticize the pub-
lic Policy which prompted the adoption of the legis-
lation. Our duty is to sustain the ·classification adop-
ted by the legislature if theTe are substanrtial· differ-
ences between the occupations separately classified. , 
·such differences need nOt be great. The past decisions 
of the Court make this abundantly clear." 
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The court in the case orf Frede~ricksburg vs. Sanitary 
Grocery Co. 168 Va. 57, 190 SE 318, 110 ALR 1195, as 
stated above sustained the classification of the grocery 
chain store into a separate class. This case along with 
the case of Bradley vs. Richmond, 227 US 477, 57 Led. 603, 
33 SOp 318 , and the case off Sedalia eoc rei. Bauman vs. Stan-
dard Oil Company, 66 Fed. 2 d 757, 95 AL.R 1514, sustain 
classification and subclassification far in excess of the Orem 
City ordinance. These cases clearly support the position 
of Plaintiff -Appellant. 
What is meant by classification or classes is well ex-· 
pressed by the. case ~f .Bradley vs .. Richmond, 227. US 477, 
57 L ed. 603, 33 SCp 318, when the U.S. Court said: 
"In order to render the classification illegal, the 
party assailing it must show that the business dis-
(~~--~--------------criminated against is preeisely the same as thart in-
cluded in the class which is alleged to be favored." 
(Underlining supplied) 
In the case of . Bueneman vs. City of Santa Barbara, 
65 Pac. 2d 785, an ordinance of the City of Santa Barbara 
impo~ a license fee of $200.00 yearly on laundries main-
taining distribution systems in the city without having a 
plrant in the city, while laundries with plants in the city 
were exempted. Th~ ordinance was held to be discrim-
inatory. The business is laundries. Then there is a sub-
clasSification of the busdness known as laundries. This is 
the type of situation that the court in the case of Bradley 
vs. Richmond, 227 US 477, 57 L ed. 603, 33 SCp 318, had 
in mind ·when it said: 
"In order to render the classification illegal, the 
party assailing it must show that the business dis-
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criininated against is precisely the sarne as that in-
cluded in the class which is alleged to be favored." 
Another case similar to the California case just cited 
is that of City of Douglas v. South Georgia Grooery ~Co.~ 
179 SE 768, wheTe the city ordinance had a provision asses-
sing an occupation tax on grocery stores in two classes; 
one class of grocery sales on a cash-and-carry system where 
all are cash sales and no deliveries outside the store; one 
class of grocery store on a system of cash and credit sales 
with deliveries outside the store. The court ·held the clas-
sification_ to be discriminatory. 
The 118Jtwal question is why treat these two types of 
grocery stores differently. It would seem here that these 
two businesses are precisely the same or at least very sim-
ilar. The Bradley case test. See also Park City ·vs. Dan-
iebl, 149 Pac. 1094. 
ln the three cases last cited, the courts held the OTdi~ 
nances to be discriminatocy, but it is to be noted that it 
was in connection with a sub-classification of the same type 
of business. In the case of Derst Baking Co. vs. Mayn•r 
and Aldermen of City of Savannah, 179 SE 7'63, the court 
said that you cannot divide a business into ·its constituent 
elements, parts, or incidents and levy a separate tax on 
each or any element, part, or incident thereof. 
~ 
The Defendant-Respondent in the case now 1befo~e the 
Court is treated the same by the Orem City ordinance as 
all used car- businesses are treated. There is not a divi-
sion of the auto business into separate parts, elements, or 
incidents. 
It is to' be noted rthart all the cases that come berore 
the !courts are those where the two or more classes are the 
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same business; laundryman vs. laundryman as to location; 
soft -drinks vs. soft drinks as to volume and character; gro-
cery vs. grocery as to cash or eredit; gasoline sales vs. gas-
oline sales as to transporting and location; bankers vs. 
bankers as to type of security dealt with; all a particular 
occupation or business that is sub-classified and subclassi-
fied. The business is precisely the same or at least very 
similar. Countless decisions recognizze the sub-classifica-
tion if a distinction can be found even in the same business. 
w~here different unrelated businesses are the ones involved 
in the alleged discrimination, rthe courts recognize and ac-
cept the classification because they are difierent types of 
businesses. 
Fundamentally, the Orem City ordinance has two levys 
-one. at the rate of $25.00 and one at one-tenth of 1% of 
the gross sales. The lower court observed that any busi-
nesses that were selling tangible, personal property at r~ 
tail such as an implement dealer, an appliance shop, cement 
plant,_ creamery, photography shop, or in the sale of goods 
made in Japan, Hong Kon.g, Formosa, China, or India 
should be taxed on the same basis as the used car dealer 
or else the ordinance was discriminatory; in other words, 
the lower oouct in effect held that you could not have a 
sub--classification .of retail sales businesses even though 
the businesses were different kinds of businesses, and even 
though the retail sales part of the business in those such as 
an appliance s:hop, cement plant, and photography shop 
were only a part of the business, and the ·main part of the 
business involved services or processing. 
The legislative body is not required to make meticu-
lous adjustments in :an effort to avoid incidental hardships 
(New York Rapid Transit Co. vs. New Yo~k, 303 US 573, 
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58 S.Ct. 721). Unless the license tax is shown to be arbi-
trary and unfair, the courts will not interfere with 1Jhe ac-
tion ill the legislative body. 
The eourts generally say the tax must apply equally 
to ·all members of a given class. The problem rtlhen comes 
down to what is meant by a given class. We submit that 
a classif~cation based on "same occupation" would fit the 
court understanding of a given ·class. The problems of 
nearly all the cases involve classlfication within the occu-
pation. 
This was the question which gave. the Utah Supreme 
Court eoocem in the case of Slater vs. Salt Lake City et al, 
115 Utah 476, 206 P2d 15-3. The Court spoke of unwarran-
ted exemptions. The Court said to permit selle~rs of cou-
ponS· redeemable m photographs or works of art to sell 
their vvares on the streets, and in the same enactment pro-
Whit magazine sales on the streets was preferring one cla.Ss 
ove ranother because it was a different item sold. 
This classification gees much fartheT than the soft 
drinks 1case <:.1ted in the forepart of this brief. The two 
cases are quite different. It would be hard to say that the 
two items sold on the street in the ease of Slater vs. Salt 
L~ke Clty et al, 115 Utah 476, 206 P 2d 153, should be 
treated differently. The Court was not considering a li-
cense fee case, but equality of use of the 1street. The Court 
said unless there is some substantial difference in the clas-
ses, one cl~ass of merchants should not be permitted to use 
the sidewalk for private gain and another -class doolied the 
same right. Equality of treatment rather than dis~crim­
ination should be the object of the ordinance. 
In the case before the Court, Defendant-Respondent 
is in the used car business. The oroinance does nort make 
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classes within the used car business; all used car businesses 
are treated alike. The ordrinance is even more fair in that 
the Defendant-Respondent being in retail sales i~s treated 
the same as orthers whose business is primarily in retail 
sales. Actually as to his own case, Defendant-eRspcmdent 
must want a breakdown of retail sales business into dif-
ferent elasses. Then we would run into what the court 
had said in the case of New York Rapid Transit Co., vs. 
New York, 303 US 573, 58 S. Ot. 721, cited ab<we. Namely, 
the legislative body is not required to make meticulous ad-
justments in effort to avoid incidental hardships, and that 
administrative convenience may justify classification for 
the purpose of taxation. 
Different retail sales 1businesses will each have ~advan­
tages and disadvantages that the other doesn't have. How 
to wei·gh them would be most difficult. If the legislative 
body tried to do so, it would be faced with other person's 
judgment as to the distinction or difference contrary to 
its' judgment. To use the words of an eminent jurist-to 
write a licensing ordinance that is precisely fair and equal 
to eaoh taxpayer and business is probably beyond the abil-
ity of man; hypothetically if a perfect ordinance were writ-
ten rtoday, the shifting economic activity of tomorrow might 
cause it to be unfair. Our legislative enactments must be 
more stable of construction and we must all accept in the 
affairs of men the mere excellence of an approach to per-
fection. 
There is no evidence in the record as to the nature of 
the business of oriental goods, or as to what was consid-
ered wl)en the framers set oriental goods out, nor is there 
any evidence that they were arbitrary or capricious. The 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
U. S. Supreme Court in the case of. Bradley vs. Richmond, 
227 lJS 477, 57 L ed. 603, 33 SCp 318, pointed out that the 
burden is on the one compl,aining of the classification to 
show it to be illegal and capricious. On its face, oriental 
goods shoWs that it is an unusual business. In a community 
such as ours, the volume of business would be minor. 
Query, what if Defendant-Respondent were to aTgue In-
dian goods are not listed, it would point out the idea of 
small volume or a 'business of such small~ness as nort to 
me,rit even a classification. The presumption is with the 
. . 
framers of the ordinance. Our society is complex and di-
verse so that to frame an ordinance that treats everyone 
exactly alike is impossible of aa.xmplishment. 
Lastly, where a statute is susceptible of two oonstru-
tions,: one o[ which will render it .constitutional and the 
other unconstitutional in whole or in part, the Court Will 
adopt the construction which, without doing vio~ence to 
the· reasonable meaning of the language used, will render 
it valid in its ~tirety, or free from doubt as to its consti-
tutionality, even though other construction is equally rea-
sonalble. It is presumed that the legislative body mtended 
nort to violate the constitution, but to make a valid O["di-
nance within the scope of its ~constitutional powers.. Every 
presumption must be in favor of the constitutionality of the 
ordinance passed by the legislative body, and to justify a 
court in pronouncing legislation unconstitutional the ·case 
must be so clear as to be free from doubt and the conflict 
of the ordinance with 'the constitution must be irrecon-
cilaJble. 
In 12 American Jurisprudence, page 214, Section 
521, the law :as to the constitutionality of ordinaniCes is sum-
marized ·as follows: 
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"In accordance with the basic rules of constitu-
tional law und~lying court review of legislation assailed 
as unconstitutional, in those cases in which laws are 
attacked as vio~ating the equality requkements of the 
Federal and State Constitutions there is a presum~ 
tion in favoc of a legislative classification, of th·e rea-
sonab~eness and fairness of legislative action, and of 
legitimate grounds of . distinction if any such groW1ds 
exist :on which the legislature acted. Hence, when fue 
classification in a law is called in question, if any rea-
sonable state af facts reasonably can be conceived that 
would sustain it, the existence of that state orf facts 
at the time the law was enacted must be assumed." 
.· "In the deiertnimttoo: -'of:.;·what classification is 
. within the range-:ofy.QiSCretion 'and what is arbitrary, 
.. reg~d. must he have _to, the particular subject of ac-
tion,. the characteristics. of the class as a whole must 
b~ lO<lked t(), and the classifi.oation is entitled to be 
te8ted ·by the conditions which uswllly and ordinarily 
exist. That similar ocdinances have been adopted and 
sustained in other states· is an indication that the clas-
sification is reasonable." 
In the exercise of the undoubted right of classifiea-
tion, it may often happen that some classes are subjected 
to regulation and some individuals are burdened with ob-
ligaftions which do nort rest on othe~ classes or other indi-
viduals not similarly situated, but this fact does not neces-
sarily vitiate an ordinance because it would practically de-
feat legislation if it were laid down as an invariable rule 
that an ordinance is void if it does not bring all within its 
scope ·or s~bject an· to the same burdens. 
Trhe legislative body is entitled to the benefit of the 
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preswnption that it acted reasonaJbly. It is the burden of 
the Defendant-Respondent, which he has not carried, to 
prove otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully contend that the Court erred in hold-
ing that the ordinance was unreasonable, arbitrary, and 
discriminatory, and request the Court for an order revers-
ing the lower court Orner of Dismissal, and declare Orem 
City Ordinance No. 26 valid and constitutional as against 
the Defendant-Respondent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. V. WENTZ, 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
and Appellant 
6 North State 
Orem, Utah 
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